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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 19-2003 
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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 1-18-cr-00230-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. John E. Jones, III 
_______________ 
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April 14, 2020 
 
Before:   AMBRO, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 15, 2020) 
_______________ 
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Scott R. Ford   [ARGUED] 
Office of United States Attorney 
Middle District of Pennsylvania 
228 Walnut Street 
P.O. Box 11754 
220 Federal Building and Courthouse 
Harrisburg, PA  17108 
          Counsel for Appellants  
 
Ronald A. Krauss   [ARGUED] 
Frederick W. Ulrich 
Office of Federal Public Defender 
100 Chestnut Street – Ste. 306 
Harrisburg, PA  17101 
          Counsel for Appellee 
_______________  
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Early on a cold February morning in 2018, 
Pennsylvania State Trooper Wesley Johnson pulled over Gary 
Bradley for speeding.  With a skillful and friendly demeanor, 
the trooper coaxed Bradley into confessing that there was 
cocaine in the vehicle he was driving.  After being indicted for 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, Bradley moved to 
suppress both his confession and the physical evidence, 
including the drugs.  The District Court granted that motion. 
 
The government now appeals the suppression of the 
physical evidence, presenting two arguments, only one of 
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which was made to the District Court.  The government has 
forfeited the argument it did not make earlier – namely, that the 
physical evidence should not have been suppressed because the 
statements Bradley made before receiving Miranda warnings 
were made voluntarily.  But the government’s second 
argument, that the cocaine would inevitably have been 
discovered because Bradley’s vehicle would have been subject 
to an inventory search, has merit.  We will, therefore, vacate 
the District Court’s order to the extent it suppressed the 
physical evidence and remand for it to decide whether any 
supplementation of the record is needed to decide whether that 
physical evidence would have been inevitably discovered, and, 
if so, whether police department policy sufficiently cabined the 
scope of the officer’s discretion in conducting the inventory 
search such that the search of the backpack, a closed container, 
would have been lawful. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Traffic Stop 
 
Trooper Johnson was sitting in his unmarked police 
vehicle at about 2:00 a.m. on February 10, 2018, on the side of 
route 81 outside of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he saw a 
car pass at approximately 45-50 mph in a zone where the speed 
limit is 65 mph.  He could not see the driver of the car as it 
passed.  Suspecting the driver was under the influence of an 
intoxicant, Johnson followed the car for about a half mile.  At 
that point, the car had accelerated and was weaving about in its 
lane.  When the car was going 75 mph, Trooper Johnson 
switched on his lights and caused the car to pull over to the side 
of the road.  When the trooper activated the lights, the Dashcam 
on his vehicle automatically began recording, so we have a 
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clear record of what was said during the conversation that 
ensued.   
 
Trooper Johnson approached the car and greeted its 
only occupant, Mr. Bradley.  As is typical, he asked for 
Bradley’s license and registration.  Bradley promptly admitted 
that his driver’s license was suspended and that the car was 
rented, so he instead gave the trooper an I.D. card and the rental 
information.  When Bradley said that he had been cited for 
driving on a suspended license “a couple times,” Johnson said 
in a cheerful way, “my man, I got bigger things to worry about, 
it’s almost the end of my shift,” and that they could “work 
through that” because it wasn’t “a big deal.”  (Dashcam Video 
at 1:48-2:04.)  Then, in the same sort of I’m-just-here-to-help 
tone of voice, Johnson told Bradley, “I’m going to bring you 
back to my car” to see if “I can cut you a break.”  (Dashcam 
Video at 3:03-27.)  After a brief hesitation, Bradley got out of 
his vehicle and went with Johnson to the police car.  Johnson 
patted down Bradley for weapons and, finding none, the two 
got into the car, with Johnson in the driver’s seat and Bradley 
in the passenger seat.   
 
Once in the car, Trooper Johnson asked Bradley a series 
of questions about where he was going and where he had been, 
all the while being remarkably solicitous.  He made frequent 
comments to put Bradley at ease, such as “Take a deep breath, 
bud, take a deep breath,” and he frequently called him “bro,” 
“bud,” and “my man.”  (Dashcam Video at 2:42-53; see 
Dashcam Video generally.)  Under Johnson’s questioning, 
Bradley said that he was on his way home from visiting his 
mother in a personal care facility in Queens, New York.  He 
also said he had just been sentenced to two and a half years in 
prison for “drugs.”  (Dashcam Video at 4:30-11:00.)  Johnson 
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continued his effort to build rapport with Bradley, asking him 
“When’s the last time you’ve been cut a legitimate break, bro?”  
(Dashcam Video at 8:25-27.)  At the same time, Johnson 
continued searching through Bradley’s driving record and the 
rental car information.  When asked about the rental car, 
Bradley explained that it was rented in his wife’s name.  The 
interrogation to that point had lasted about ten minutes.     
 
Appearing to have finished processing the information 
related to the traffic stop, Johnson told Bradley that he was 
going to give him a warning for speeding and that he would not 
cite him for weaving in his lane of traffic.  Despite those 
statements, however, it seems that Johnson never intended to 
let Bradley go with just a warning.  He later acknowledged at 
the suppression hearing that he would not have let Bradley 
drive away.  In fact, he said that from the beginning he 
suspected criminal activity of some kind.  For that reason, he 
had called for backup, and at about that ten-minute mark in the 
stop, Corporal Brian Hoye arrived on the scene.     
 
As Corporal Hoye approached the unmarked police car, 
Trooper Johnson began a more pointed line of questioning, 
focusing on the contents of the rental car.  Specifically, he 
asked Bradley whether there were any guns, marijuana, large 
sums of U.S. currency, heroin, or cocaine in the car.  Bradley 
denied having any of those items, but Johnson later testified 
that he “noticed a deviation in the way [Bradley] responded to 
the question of cocaine.”  (App. at 121.)  Johnson asked again 
whether any of the previously listed things were in the car.  By 
then, Corporal Hoye was standing next to where Bradley sat, 
and this time, flanked by state troopers, Bradley admitted he 
had cocaine.   
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Johnson then quickly recited the Miranda warnings,1 
telling Bradley he was “not free to leave.”  (Dashcam Video at 
13:40-55.)  Close to fifteen minutes of questioning had gone 
on, most of it in the police vehicle, before the warnings were 
given.  Immediately thereafter, Johnson asked, “Now, how 
much cocaine is in the car?”  (Dashcam Video at 13:55-57.)  
Bradley answered, “a lot.”  (App. at 123.)  At that point, 
Johnson believed he had probable cause to search the vehicle.  
He asked Bradley where the cocaine was, and Bradley told him 
it was in the trunk.  He handcuffed Bradley and left him in the 
care of Corporal Hoye while he went back to the vehicle to 
search for the cocaine.  As Bradley had said, about a kilo of 
cocaine in a backpack was lying in the trunk of the car.  The 
officers told Bradley he was under arrest for possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute.   
 
B. The Procedural History 
 
After he was indicted and arraigned, Bradley filed a 
motion to suppress.  In his briefing on that motion, he argued 
that Trooper Johnson had unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop 
and that the stop involved a custodial interrogation without the 
benefit of Miranda warnings.  The government argued that the 
stop had not been unnecessarily prolonged, that Bradley was 
not in custody, and that no warrant was necessary under the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement.2   
 
 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
2 See generally California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 
(1991). 
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At the suppression hearing, Trooper Johnson and 
Bradley testified, and both parties played portions of the 
Dashcam video.  In addition to recounting the incident, 
Johnson testified that, because of the suspended license, he 
would not have allowed Bradley to drive away.  Instead, as a 
matter of routine, Bradley’s vehicle would have been towed 
and the police would have conducted an inventory search of it.  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court requested 
further briefing on the suppression motion, and Bradley 
responded in his post-hearing submission by arguing that his 
statements to Johnson were effectively involuntary because 
they were made under custodial interrogation and therefore the 
statements and physical evidence should be suppressed.  The 
government argued that, even if Bradley’s pre-Miranda 
statements were suppressed, his post-Miranda statements were 
voluntary and should be admissible in evidence, and it further 
contended that the cocaine would have inevitably been 
discovered when the rental car was impounded.   
 
The District Court granted the motion to suppress 
Bradley’s pre- and post-Miranda statements, as well as the 
evidence that was discovered in the vehicle as a result of those 
statements.  The Court focused primarily on the admissibility 
of Bradley’s statements: whether they were given as part of a 
custodial interrogation, and whether the post-Miranda 
statements were given voluntarily.  See generally United States 
v. Bradley, 370 F. Supp. 3d 458 (M.D. Pa. 2019).  It found that, 
at least from the time Corporal Hoye arrived on the scene, 
Bradley was subjected to custodial interrogation, and that 
Bradley’s post-Miranda statements were not voluntary.  In 
closing, it addressed whether the physical evidence should also 
be suppressed or whether it would have been inevitably 
discovered in an inventory search.  The District Court decided 
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that the possibility of an inventory search was merely 
speculative, and it therefore ordered that the physical evidence, 
as well as Bradley’s statements, be suppressed.   
 
The government has timely appealed.   
 
II. Discussion3 
 
On appeal, the government argues only for the 
admissibility of the physical evidence seized from the rental 
car.  Its first argument is that the physical evidence should not 
be suppressed because the statements Bradley made before 
hearing his Miranda rights were voluntarily made.  It also 
argues that, in any event, the physical evidence would have 
been discovered in a lawful inventory search when the police 
impounded Bradley’s vehicle.  The government has forfeited 
its argument concerning the pre-Miranda statements, but it 
successfully preserved its argument that the cocaine and 
related evidence would have been inevitably discovered in an 
inventory search.   
 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.  In 
considering the outcome of a motion to suppress, “we review 
a district court’s factual findings for clear error, and we 
exercise de novo review over its application of the law to those 
factual findings.”  United States v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200, 
203 n.15 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Katzin, 769 
F.3d 163, 169 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc)). 
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A. Argument Forfeiture 
 
The government’s argument about the voluntariness of 
Bradley’s pre-Miranda statements is markedly different from 
the one it made before the District Court.  There, its position 
was that, regardless of whether the pre-Miranda statements 
were illegitimately obtained, the post-Miranda statements 
were voluntary and sufficient to permit the search that yielded 
the physical evidence.  Only now is it insisting that the pre-
Miranda statements were voluntary and should be the focus of 
attention.  Consequently, while the government rightly says 
that suppression is inappropriate when evidence has been 
discovered based on voluntary statements, United States v. 
DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2001), that point is 
unpersuasive here, since the voluntariness of the pre-Miranda 
statements was not argued to the District Court, and the Court’s 
ruling on the involuntariness of the post-Miranda statements 
has not been challenged before us.   
 
The government, just like a defendant, is “subject to the 
ordinary rule that an argument not raised in the district court is 
waived on appeal[.]”  United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 
728 (3d Cir. 2010); accord United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 
540, 551 n.11 (3d Cir. 2010).  “[T]he argument presented in 
the Court of Appeals must depend on both the same legal rule 
and the same facts as the argument presented in the District 
Court.”  United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 
2013).  “[T]he degree of particularity required to preserve an 
argument is exacting.”  Id. at 337.  Thus, “fleeting reference or 
vague allusion to an issue will not suffice to preserve it for 
appeal.”  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 
262 (3d Cir. 2009).   
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 The government’s claim that it preserved the 
voluntariness issue in its suppression motion briefing by citing 
to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), without discussing 
how it applies to the facts of this case, does not satisfy that 
standard.  It is apparent on this record that the government 
failed to argue before the District Court that the evidence 
should not be suppressed because the pre-Miranda statements 
were made voluntarily.  Moreover, the government never 
invoked the legal rule it relies upon as dispositive on appeal, 
namely that the physical fruits of voluntary statements are 
admissible regardless of whether Miranda warnings were 
given.  DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180.  The argument has thus 
been forfeited, and we will not consider it. 
 
B. Inevitable Discovery 
 
The government did, however, preserve its argument 
that, even without Bradley’s statements, the physical evidence 
would have been discovered during a proper inventory search 
of the rental car.  The District Court was unpersuaded, 
concluding that the possibility of such a search was speculative 
and that the government had thus not carried its burden of 
proving inevitable discovery.  The government renews its 
argument now, and we see much more merit in it.  Indeed, we 
disagree with the District Court’s labeling as speculative the 
likelihood of an inventory search, but more work needs to be 
done to determine the lawfulness of the search of the 
backpack.4  
 
4 The government also argues that the cocaine would 
inevitably have been discovered through a search by a dog 
trained to detect drugs, but that argument fails.  As Johnson 
himself admitted, while he suspected criminal activity from the 
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Evidence obtained by the police unlawfully may 
nonetheless be admitted into evidence “if the prosecution can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
information ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means[.]”  United States v. Vasquez De 
Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)).  One lawful means by 
which the police may discover evidence is to conduct an 
inventory search of an impounded vehicle, as “inventory 
searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”  Colorado v. Bertine, 
479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987).   
 
The government bears the burden of proving that 
evidence would have inevitably been discovered, and it can 
satisfy that burden by demonstrating that the police, following 
their routine procedures, would have uncovered it.  Vasquez De 
Reyes, 149 F.3d at 195.  An analysis of whether certain 
evidence would have been discovered in an inventory search, 
including whether an inventory search would have occurred at 
all, should be based “upon the historical facts capable of ready 
verification, and not speculation.”  Id.; see also Nix, 467 U.S. 
at 444 n.5 (“[I]nevitable discovery involves no speculative 
elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable 
of ready verification[.]”).  The government may establish 
routine police procedures by submitting them into evidence, 
 
beginning of the traffic stop, his suspicions were “not 
necessarily [about] drug activity.”  Thus, as the District Court 
correctly observed, it is just speculation that, without Bradley’s 
statements, Johnson would have called for a drug-detecting 
dog to come to the scene.  
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including by “testimony regarding standard practices.”  United 
States v. Mundy, 621 F.3d 283, 290 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
United States v. Thompson, 29 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 
Here, the government argues that, whether or not 
Bradley ever said a word, the cocaine in the trunk of his car 
would have been found.  According to the government, it 
established through the Dashcam evidence and the testimony 
of Trooper Johnson that Bradley was driving on a suspended 
license, that he therefore could not continue driving the car, 
that police procedure called for the vehicle to be towed and 
impounded, and that necessarily there would have been an 
inventory search that would have revealed the cocaine.  None 
of that seems speculative to us.  On the contrary, it tracks 
Pennsylvania law that requires the police to order a vehicle 
towed if the driver has a suspended license and towing is “in 
the interest of public safety.”  75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6309.2(a)(1). And it is consistent with Johnson’s testimony 
that he would not have let Bradley drive away, that Bradley’s 
vehicle would have been impounded, and that there would 
have been an inventory search consistent with standard 
procedures.      
 
Nevertheless, the District Court thought the testimony 
was speculative because Trooper Johnson “did not aver that 
protocol mandated that he tow and inventory Bradley’s vehicle 
as a result of his suspended license.”  Bradley, 370 F. Supp. 3d 
at 477.  The Court suggested that some alternative besides 
towing and impoundment would have been more consistent 
with Trooper Johnson’s statement to Bradley that he would 
“cut him a break.”  (App. at 44.)  But the existence of 
alternative methods of removing a vehicle from a snowy 
highway in the middle of the night does not negate Trooper 
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Johnson’s sworn and unrebutted testimony of what police 
procedures called for and what he would have done even if 
Bradley had not confessed.  That Johnson did not use the word 
“mandated” or some like term to describe the procedures he 
referenced is certainly not dispositive.    
 
At the same time, Trooper Johnson testified that the 
cocaine was found in Bradley’s backpack, which was lying in 
plain view in the trunk of the car.  Police have discretion to 
inventory a closed container, no doubt, see e.g., Bertine, 479 
U.S. at 374, but only where there is evidence of a policy or 
regulation sufficiently limiting the scope of that discretion.5  
See United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1120 (3d Cir. 
1991), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he pre-
existing criteria or routine must limit an officer's discretion 
regarding the scope of an inventory search, particularly with 
respect to the treatment of closed containers.”); see also 
Mundy, 621 F.3d at 291–92 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(holding lawful an inventory search of a container where 
department policy “specifically authoriz[ed] the search of the 
trunk if accessible” and “forb[ade] any locked areas, including 
the trunk area, from being forced open” because the policy 
sufficiently limited the scope of officer discretion when it “(1) 
authorized [the officer] to inventory any personal property of 
value left in the trunk once [the individual] provided the keys 
to it; and (2) simultaneously curtailed his authority to embark 
on a generalized search for incidents of crime”).    
 
 
5 That is not to say that there must be a written policy or 
a regulation, but rather that there must be criteria or routines 
that govern inventory searches. 
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Given Trooper Johnson’s testimony concerning police 
procedure and the course he would have taken once Bradley’s 
ineligibility to drive had been revealed, and given that the 
cocaine was inside a backpack that was in plain view when the 
trunk of the rental car was opened, it seems probable that the 
police would have discovered the cocaine in an inventory 
search.  But more information on police procedures – including 
protocols for the conduct of an inventory search and the scope 
of an officer’s discretion during such a search – is likely needed 
before making a final determination on inevitable discovery.  
Thus, we ask the District Court on remand to reopen the record 
and take further evidence.    
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order suppressing the physical evidence and remand 
the matter for further consideration. 
